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America has become a "throwaway society."' From disposable diapers to
fast-food packaging, "[Americans] generate enough solid waste2 every day to fill the
New Orleans Superdome from floor to ceiling twice."3 Until recently, however,
most citizens' concern extended no further than the curb.4 But in March 1987, the
nation's attention focused on the "Mobro," a smelly barge loaded with 3,168 tons
of garbage.5 As it left New York, the Mobro embarked on a 6,000 mile, 162 day
odyssey only to return loaded with the same cargo.6 No place could be found for its
disposal. 7 The news accounts-sometimes humorous, sometimes serious-helped
change the attitude of a nation. Solid waste disposal is everyone's problem, and must
be attacked with fervor and ingenuity.
As densely populated areas, particularly in the Northeast corridor, run out of
available disposal capacity,9 more states and local governments look towards
shipping wastes to other areas of the country where space is available' 0 and disposal
is relatively inexpensive." In turn, residents of those areas often resent what they
view as unwarranted dumping of foreign wastes and exert significant political
pressure to prevent such disposal.1 2
'C. MILLER & L. BERRY, WASTES, 4 (1986). Figures from 1986 estimate that while the United States
comprises about 5% of the world's population, Americans consume 40% of the worlds resources. Id.
ISolid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901-6992 (1980). Solid waste includes garbage, refuse and/or
sludge resulting from industrial, commercial, argicultural or community activities. 42 U.S.C. § 6903 (27)
(1989). While § 6903(5)(B) states that the term solid waste includes those wastes hazardous to human
health or the environment, this Comment focuses on disposal of non-hazardous solid waste.
I C. MU.LER & L. BERRY, supra note 1, at 7.
4 Del Bello, The Politics of Garbage: The Influence of the PoliticalProcess on the Construction of a Refuse-
To-Energy Plant, 14 COLUM, J. ENvTL. L. 357, 360 (1989).
'K. O'CONNOR, GARmcAE, 9 (1989). The barge "Mobro" left Islip, New York after local officials refused to
accept commercial solid wastes at local landfills. Id.
6Id.
Id. at 14. On Aug. 10, 1987, a Brooklyn superior court judge ordered the incineration of the waste. Id.
I1d. at 14-17.
9 R. LONG, THE PROBLEM OF WASTE DtsposAL, 7 (1989)
"0 See generally Mac Fayden, Where Wil All The Garbage Go? A'n..nc (March 1985), excerpted in LONG,
Tim PROBLEM OF WATE DIsposAL, supra note 9, at 9. The West and Southwest provide large open areas for
disposal. Id. The Midwest also receives a large portion of excess waste from the East Coast. Government
Suppliers Consolidating Servs. v. Bayh, 753 F. Supp. 739, 748 (S.D. Ind. 1990).
" Government Suppliers, 753 F. Supp. at 748. Disposal costs in Indiana landfills are approximately $12/
ton compared with $125/ton fee charged at the Fresh Kills landfill on Long Island. Id.
12 Stone, Supremacy and Commerce Clause Issues Regarding State Hazardous Waste Import Bans, 15
COLUM. J. ENvNr. L. 1, 2-3 (1990).
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Within this framework of problems and concerns, all branches of government
must strive to seek both short and long term solutions to a dilemma which threatens
to literally bury America in its own waste.
THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
Estimates of the volume of waste generated vary greatly, but by any
measure, the scope of the problem is enormous.' 3 In New York City alone,
approximately 24,000 tons of household and commercial refuse are collected
daily. 1 4 "On the West Coast, Los Angeles County's Puente Hills landfill reaches its
daily quota of twelve thousand tons of trash before noon."15 While the problem is
most keenly felt in older cities, 16 and densely populated suburban areas, the impact
of the problem is felt nationwide.
As the volume of disposable waste continues to grow, state and local officials
are faced with the unenviable task of figuring out what to do with it." Long term
solutions such as recycling, 9 resource recovery techniques, 20 composting2 and
incineration22 provide some hope for the future. While some immediate relief can
be found in non-exotic techniques such as baling, compacting and shredding, 23 none
of these methods provide adequate solutions to the acute shortage of available
disposal capacity.
Disposal problems are further exacerbated by the dwindling number of
13 Davis, Garbage: To Burn OrNot To Burn?, 90 TEac. REv. 19,19 (Feb.-Mar., 1987). Davis estimates that
Americans generate 220 million tons of garbage annually. Id.. See also MacFayden, supra note 10,, at 8.
The Fresh Kills landfill on Staten Island, N.Y., accepts 11,000 tons of garbage daily. Id. The landfill
presently covers more than 3,000 acres and rises several hundred feet about sea level. Id.
M4 MAcFADYEN, supra note 10, at 8.
"K. O'CONNOR, supra note 5, at 18.
"MAcFADrEN, supra note 10, at 9.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 8-9. Paul Casowitz, Deputy Commissioner of Sanitation for New York City, estimates that even
under the most optimistic projections, landfill capacity in the New York area will be completely exhausted
in twelve to fifteen years.
" While this Comments does not focus on recycling as a solution to diminishing capacity, many states and
local governments have instituted recycling programs. For example, Pennsylvania mandated recycling by
enacting The Municipal Waste Planning, Recycling and Waste Reduction Act (1988) See, e.g., PASTAT. ANN
tit. 53 §§ 4000, 1501-1512 (Purdon Supp. 1991). This Act requires landfills to establish recycling centers
with the goal of reducing municipal solid waste by 25% by 1997. See also Goldoftas, Recycling; Coming
ofAge, 90 TEcH. Rav. 28 (Nov..-Dec., 1987). Currently, more than 14 states and over 500 communities offer
curbside collection of recyclable materials. Id. at 30.
20 See Delbello, supra note 4, at 359. See also Davis, supra note 12, at 19.
21 Haertsch, PEO Provides $75,000 Recycling Grant to Lackawanna County, 4 Pennsylvania Energy 12, 12
(Oct. 1990). Materials such as newspapers, leaves and yard wastes can be shredded and composted for land
reclamation projects. Id.
22 Hershkowitz, Burning Trash: How It Could Work, 90 Tct. REv. 26, 26 (July 1987). Entities in at least
40 states are involved with resource recovery plants which burn trash to generate alternative energies.
I MACFADV'rN, supra note 10 at 10.
[Vol. 24:3 & 4
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landfills properly licensed to receive waste. 24 According to some estimates, "[h]alf
of the country's 18,500 landfills which were open ten years ago are now closed.
2
Concurrently, the cost of waste disposal has increased dramatically. In cities such
as Boston and Philadelphia, disposal costs have soared to a range of $90 to $150 per
ton.26 Cost estimates for waste removal in New York rose from $5 per ton in 1986
to $150 in 1989.27
Faced with the numerous problems associated with increasing costs and
decreasing capacity, it is not surprising that states are looking towards other areas
of the country for available space. In 1988, New Jersey began to export its garbage
to neighboring states.28 In Pennsylvania, Lawrence County officials have adopted
a 10 year solid waste plan which calls for 60% of its disposable waste to be hauled
to a landfill in Ohio.29 In Indiana, where landfill capacity is still available30 and the
cost of disposal relatively low,3" large quantities of waste are shipped in daily from
various portions of the Eastern States.32
Local opposition to the importation of foreign waste is often swift and intense.
Judicial recognition of the Not In My Backyard syndrome (NIMBY) frequently
appears in cases challenging importation.3 3 Commentators recognize that well-
organized local opposition can be a politically potent force. 34 For example, in 1988,
a "Stop The Dump" group in Mississippi successfully introduced legislation which
required county referendums to permit hazardous waste siting.35 Similarly, public
opinion in Utah was instrumental in the passage of stringent siting criteria.36
Thus the nation faces a dilemma of mounting proportions. Clearly, disposal
of solid waste is not a local problem nor one which can be solved in the short term.
21 Id. In 1934, New York had 89 landfills. In 1984, only three remained. Id. Nationwide, only half of the
9,244 municipal landfills have valid operating permits. Id. New Jersey officials report only 13 remaining
landfills while Michigan and Washington are experiencing similar problems. Hershkowitz, supra note 22,
at 26. In Ohio, the only existing landfill in Columbiana County is appealing an EPA closure order.
Wilkinson, Three-County District Approves Sketchy 10-year Disposal Plan, The Youngstown Vindicator,
Dec. 2, 1990 at B4 col. 1.
2 K. O'CONNOR, supra, note 5, at 18.26 1d. at 19.
27 Id. at 20.
29 Id. at 18.
29 The Youngstown Vindicator, Feb. 6, 1991, at B7 col. 3.
30 Government Suppliers, 753 F. Supp. at 743.
31 Id. at 748. Even including transportation costs of $30-$35 per ton, Indiana's disposal costs remain
substantially lower than those at East Coast landfills. Id.
32 Id. Teams of volunteers at one Indiana landfill were able to document 5,500 trucks headed for the site,
many from out of state. Plaintiff Castenova, a trash broker, testified that about 60% of Government's
business resulted from transporting wastes from New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania to Indiana. Id.
at 749.
13 Swin Resource Sys. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 253 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1127 (1990).
34 Stone, supra note 12, at 2.
15 Id. at 3.
36 d. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has expressed concern over adoption of such rules. Id.
More than 20 states have been identified as having restrictive siting laws. Id. 3
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Valid solutions must balance the needs of those communities with a shortage of
disposal capacity and the interests of those who are forced to accept large amounts
of foreign wastes.
This Comment explores the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution
and the restraints it places on state and local governments which attempt to restrict
the importation of waste. Additionally, it will focus on the development of
exclusionary alternatives including the market participant exception and regulatory
schemes designed to avoid Commerce Clause scrutiny. Finally, this Comment will
examine the possibility of using free market techniques to develop an alternative to
the traditional command and control 7 methods of regulation.
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The free flow of goods and services goes to the very essence of our national
existence.3" However, conflict arises when the flow of commerce is in "goods"39
which are potentially harmful. Solid and hazardous wastes are such "goods".
Whether couched in terms of protecting local health and safety, preserving scarce
local resources or protecting the local economic integrity, efforts to halt the
importation of waste inevitably involve protectionist measures which impede the
free flow of commerce.40 The tension which results from these competing interests
serves as the backdrop for legal challenges to state and local efforts to reduce the
influx of waste.
Article I, § 8, cl. 3 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress plenary authority
to "regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states...,,"I
Clearly, the importance of this authority was not lost on the Framers. Indeed, many
historians argue that the need for Federal control of commerce served as a major
catalyst in the efforts to amend the Articles of Confederation. 2 As Justice Jackson
explains in H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond:43 "The sole purpose for which
Virginia initiated the movement which ultimately produced the Constitution was to
'take into consideration the trade of the United States...' No other federal power
3 7 F. ANDERSON, D. MANwELmR & A. TARLocK, EnvironmentalProtection: Laws and Policy, 65-70, (2d ed.
1990) [hereinafter F. ANDERsoN]. Command and control regulation proceeds from the assumption that any
activity may continue if it complies with appicable regulations. Id.
38 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622-23 (1978).
I d. at 622. All objects of interstate trade merit Commerce Clause protection; none are excluded at the
outset. Id.
41 Id. at 622-26. Under Commerce Clause scrutiny, the legislative purpose is immaterial. Id. at 626.
Protectionist measures are invalid whether the purported ends are to protect the environment, the economy
or "for whatever purpose." Id. at 624.
4' U.S. CONST. art. I., 8, cl. 3.42 G. uGniER, CONSITrUnTONAL LAw, 99 (1 1th ed. 1985). Proliferating trade rivalries among the states was
an immediate provocation for the calling of the Constitutional Convention.
43 H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949). Id.
[Vol. 24:3 & 4AKRON LAW R~vrmw
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was so universally assumed to be necessary, no other state power was so readily
relinquished." 4"
While deceptively simple in its language, this regulatory power has evolved
over the course of two centuries to become the most far reaching of all peace-time
powers granted Congress.4 5 Today, this power is manifested in a judicial construc-
tion which preserves national solidarity by preventing the rivalries and reprisals" as-
sociated with the economic self interests of individual sovereign states.
In practice, the Commerce Clause exists in two forms. In its unexercised or
dormant form, state actions which impinge upon free trade are barred in spite of
Congressional silence.47 In its active form, Congress has exercised its power to
regulate commerce, and therefore, contrary state action must yield in light of the
Supremacy Clause."
In spite of numerous pieces of federal legislation generally affecting waste
disposal,49 Congress has not exercised direct regulatory control.5 0 Thus most Com-
merce Clause attacks are launched against state attempts to restrict the importation
of exogenous wastes and are based upon the dormant Commerce Clause. In the
majority of these cases, the court employs a balancing approach5 which permits
limited incursion upon free trade when a statute evenhandedly effectuates a
legitimate local public interest and the effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental.52 Such statutes will be upheld "unless the burden imposed on commerce
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." 53 The question become
one in which the court must determine the nature and extent of such burdens, and
weigh their relative value in light of Commerce Clause proscriptions.
44 Id. at 533-34.
"- GUNTHER, supra note 42, at 99. In the 200 years since ratification, the judiciary has imposed very few
checks on the commerce power. Id.
46 Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511,522-23 (1935). See also G. GuNTHER, supra note 42, at 99.
The Framers envisioned a national commerce which would end hostile state restrictions, retaliatory trade
regulations and protective tariffs. Id.4 7 Pomper, Recycling Philadelphia v. New Jersey: The Dormant Commerce Clause, Postindustrial "Natural
Resources" And The Solid Waste Crisis, 137 U. PA. L.R. 1309, 1313 (1989). See also G. GUNTHER, supra
note 42, at 231.
" U.S. CoNsT. art IV.; See also G. GUNTHER, supra note 42, at 231. Once Congress has indicated a policy,
state action may be successfully challenged if it conflicts with the "supreme" national legislation. Id.
49 See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42U.S.C. § 6901-6962 (1989); Comprehen-
sive Environmental Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675 (1989).
" Government Suppliers, 753 F. Supp. at 763 n. 26. Congress may authorize the state to engage in
regulation that the Commerce Clause would otherwise prohibit. The Bayh court, however, found no such
federal enactment. Id.
' Note, Hazardous Waste In Interstate Commerce: Minimizing The Problem After City Of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 24 VAL. U.L. Ry. 77, 92-93 (1989). Commerce Clause analysis traditionally contains two
prongs: a per se rule of invalidity in cases of overt or practical economic protectionism, and a balancing test
where discrimination is not present. Id.
"i Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
53
d.
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A. An Exception To Restraint
In 1976, The Supreme Court developed a somewhat curious exception to
Commerce Clause restraints. In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Co.,' plaintiffs
mounted a Commerce Clause challenge against a Maryland scheme which paid a
bounty for the collection of abandoned automobiles. The scheme favored in-state
scrappers over those outside Maryland. 5  In rejecting the Commerce Clause chal-
lenge, Justice Powell explained that unlike the usual attempts to restrict trade,
Maryland had entered the market as a participant rather than a regulator.56 He found
that "nothing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State...
from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over
others.1 57 Thus traditional Commerce Clause restraints were relaxed for states
willing to enter the market place as active participants.
In succeeding cases, this newly found market participant exception survived
as it struggled for a conceptual basis. In Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 8 the Court upheld a
South Dakota plan which confined the sale of cement from a state owned plant to
state residents in a time of shortage. Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court,
counseled that there is "no indication of a constitutional plan to limit the ability of
the States themselves to operate freely in a free market." 59 States may fairly claim
some measure of sovereign interest in retaining freedom to decide how, with whom
and for whose benefit to deal.60
The parameters of this doctrine were further brought into focus in South
Central Timer Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke.6' Here the Court rejected a market
participant defense of a statute which attempted to limit the sale of timber to those
who would later process it. The Court found the state action too attenuated from
actual participation in the market to justify the "downstream" restraints on com-
merce.62 Justice White defined the limits of the doctrine as follows: a State may
impose burdens on commerce within the market in which it is a participant, it may
not impose substantial regulatory effects outside that particular market. 63
Certainly not all observers share a view that the market participant exception
is well founded or of continuing vitality. In a sharp dissent to Swin Resource Sys.
v. Lycoming County,6 Judge Gibson found the notion that state enterprises "partici-
' Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
sId. at 794.
IJd. at 806.
17 Id. at 810.
" Reeves, Inc. v. Stake 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
-9 Id. at 437.
60ld. at 439 n. 12.
"South-Central Timer Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984).621d. at 99.
63 Id. at 97.
"Swin Resource Sys. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245 (3d. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1127
(1990).
[Vol. 24:3 & 4
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pate in the market on the same footing as private concerns is a chimera," because
"government market participants invariably seek political goals in place of eco-
nomic ends." 65 In Judge Gibson's view, "the whole charade of the market participant
exception" is a "peculiar manifestation of a 'new federalism' run amok.""6 More-
over, Judge Gibson believes that notwithstanding the doctrine's theoretical basis,
the Supreme Court effectively overruled the market participant exception in Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,67 and thus it is no longer a viable exception to
the Commerce Clause .6  Nevertheless, subsequent cases continue to employ the
doctrine, 69 and the market participant exception remains a viable alternative for
states that wish to exercise some control over waste importation. °
B. Landfill Space As A Natural Resource
As typified by the reasoning in Hughes v. Oklahoma,7' and New England
Power Co. v. New Hampshire,2 the modem Court has attempted to deal with state
efforts to restrict access of certain natural resources to in-state residents at the
expense of national users. Generally, the cases hold that when natural resources
occur by the peculiar effects of climate or geology, such resources are part of the
national bounty."1 Without more, a state which happens to be blessed with an
abundance of such resources may not hoard or reserve access without violating the
Commerce Clause. 4 However, the Court has drawn a distinction between those
"natural" resources which are a product of pure happenstance," and those which
have some "indicia of goods publicly produced and owned in which a state may
legitimately favor its own citizens in time of shortage.
7 6
With respect to landfills, two questions arise. First, should the market
participant exception apply when a state attempts to regulate the exploitation of a
6 Id. at 261-62 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
66Id.
" Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 889 (1988)
(Garcia held that the Tenth Amendment does not preclude Congress from preempting state activities which
are considered traditional governmental functions).
" See article and accompanying text cited infra note 70.
6See, e.g., Diamond Waste, Inc. v. Monroe County, 731 F. Supp. 505 (M.D. Ga. 1990).
"' Pomper, supra note 46, at 1319-22. According to Pomper, the theoretical basis of the market participant
exception can be based on grounds other than traditional governmental functions, and should thus survive
Garcia. Id. at 1320.
"' Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (State law restricting the exportation of minnows procured
within the waters of Oklahoma held invalid.)
"
2 New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982). The Court found that a New Hampshire
plan to reserve hydroelectric power to state residents was a protectionist scheme designed to gain economic
advantage. Id. at 339. The Court condemned the scheme as an invalid attempt to restrain the exportation
of a natural resource. Id. at 344.
"' Swin Resource Sys., 883 F.2d at 254.
4 Id.
" Reeves, 447 U.S. at 443. The Court held that the market participant exception of Alexandria Scrap did
not permit a state to hoard resources which were found within its borders by mere happenstance. Id.
7 6 Sporhase v. Nebraska ex. rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941,957 (1982). See also Baldwin v. Montana Fish and
Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978) (Increased non-resident hunting fees held valid because state devoted
resources to the conservation of elk herd.) 7
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"natural resource?" Second, does landfill space qualify as a "natural resource?"
With respect to the first question, the signals are mixed. A survey of Supreme Court
dicta indicates some willingness to apply the market participant exception doctrine
to natural resources when some level of state involvement is reflected by conserva-
tion or exploitation.77 At other times, the Court appears reluctant to extend the
doctrine beyond the sale of quantities actually produced by the state."
If a state may permissibly reserve the finished products of natural resources
to its own residents,7 9 then there is no logical point at which the finished product
becomes disconnected from its constituent parts. The exportation of natural
resources which have been exploited by state activities so that their form becomes
usable should not be exempted from the market participant exception. Thus, if the
"natural" resource is a product of substantial state involvement, rather than mere
happenstance, the doctrine should apply. It follows that space developed for a
landfill is not a natural resource in the same sense as geological deposits, and should
not be exempted from the market participant exception. It is tempting to find that
land is a natural resource per se and is not subject to restricted access under usual
Commerce Clause principles.8 0 However, such an approach fails to account for the
extensive economic expenditures necessary to meet all federal, state and local
requirements for the operation of alandfill.81 Certainly such extensive development
is more than mere happenstance. A land-use natural resource requires a particular-
ized inquiry rather than a general conclusion before exclusion from the market
participant exception is warranted.
THE LEGACY OF CITY OF PHIADELPHMA V. NEW JERSEY
The relationship between the Commerce Clause and attempts to restrict the
flow of exogenous waste came into focus in 1978 when the Supreme Court decided
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey.2 Fearing the depletion of usable landfll space,
the New Jersey legislature enacted the Waste Control Act8 3 which effectively placed
the burden of preservation upon out-of-state sources of solid waste. 4 In upholding
the constitutional challenge, the Court determined that wastes were articles of
commerce85 and subject to the strictures of Commerce Clause protection.8 6 The
Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 957.
7 ' See New England Power Co., 455 U.S. at 338-39 n. 6.
'See Reeves 447 U.S. at 443.
So Swin Resource Sys., 883 F.2d at 253.
" See supra note 49. Substantial federal standards are imposed under RCRA, while state and local
restrictions may superimpose additional obligations.
2 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
$3 Waste Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANNi. § 13:ll-10(West 1970). The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the
Act because it promoted vital health and environmental objectives. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 620,
626.
" Waste Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:11-10 (West 1979). Ch. 363 blocked the importation of all
categories of wastes unless exempted by rules of the State Commissioner of Environmental Protection.
City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. At 622.
Id. at 622-23.
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Court found the Act to be protectionist with its primary purpose to disadvantage out-
of-state residents by restricting the free flow of commerce.87 In finding the statutory
scheme facially discriminatory,"8 the Court held the Act to be an impermissible
attempt to gain economic advantage at the expense of free trade. 9
Whether correctly decided or not,90 the legacy of Philadelphia lives on.
Invariably, plaintiffs who mount a Commerce Clause attack invoke Philadelphia as
the foundation of their challenge.9'
ATMprrs To CiRcUMVENT CrrY OF PHILADELIA V. NEW JERSEY
In the years since Philadelphia, state and local governments have employed
various methods to circumvent its restrictions. 92 Although widely divergent in their
detail, these schemes may be broadly categorized into three groups: the creation of
economic incentives, the market participant exception and the development of
county-wide disposal plans.93 Each of these methods has something to offer in the
search for a solution to the overall problem.
A. Economic Methods
The economic incentive to ship solid waste from its point of origin to some
foreign disposal site is obvious. When the costs of in-state disposal exceed the
combined costs of transportation and disposal elsewhere, it becomes economically
advantageous to do so. The problem for receiving sites, whether publicly or
privately owned, relates to the external costs not typically reimbursed by disposal
fees.M To view these costs in perspective, it is helpful to characterize the problem
as the exportation of goods and services from the receiving state rather than the
importation of foreign waste by the receiving state.95 Clearly, the receiving state
exports access to its landfill sites. The relative scarcity of that commodity will in
part determine the fee paid by the shipping state. But, in addition, the receiving state
7 d. at 628.
" Id. at 626. The Court found protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as ends. Id. The statute
was found to be discriminatory both on its face and in its plain effect, and thus the Pike balancing test was
unnecessary. Id.
99 Id. at 629.
90d. at 632 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). In dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that the case should have been
decided under previous rulings which have exempted state quarantine laws banning the importation of
materials which were "diseased, decayed or otherwise" from scrutiny. See Bowman v. Chicago &
Northwestern Ry., 125 U.S. 465 (1888).
9 See Diamond Waste, Inc. v. Monroe County, 731 F. Supp. 505 (M.D. Ga. 1990); Kettlewell Excavating
v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 732F. Supp. (E. D. Mich. 1990) aff d, 931 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1991);
Swin Resource Sys. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245 (3d. Cir. 1989) cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1127 (1990).
92 Note, supra note 51, at 91-99.
9 Pomper, supra note 47, at 1337. This Comment does not examine a fourth alternative: direct federal
intervention via detailed regulation.
94F. A1NaRsoN, supra note 37, at 35-36.
Note, supra note 51 at 91-99.
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exports services in the form of site acquisition, construction, maintenance and
compliance with governmental regulation. 96 Again, the fixed costs associated with
these services will generally be reflected in the fees charged to shipping states.97
There are, however, additional costs which the receiving state must bear. The social
costs related to health risks, possible environmental degradation9 s and reduced land
use values near dump sites are examples of external costs not reimbursed by the
shipping state. Ironically, when the receiving state bears these external costs, it
alleviates the shipping state from absorbing the same. 99 When the burden of external
costs becomes excessive, the receiving state is forced to attempt to correct the
imbalance of costs and benefits. Generally, these measures seek to reduce the
economic incentive to import by imposing regulatory controls upon the volume of
waste imported. 1°°
1. Indiana's Experience
Legislative and executive efforts to eliminate economic incentives was the
focus of Indiana's statutory attempt to curb the importation of foreign waste. 101 The
citizens of Indiana, as well as those of many Midwestem states, reside in an area
which has become an economically favorable dumping ground for the solid wastes
of the Eastern States. 12 On April 9, 1990, the governorof Indiana, Evan Bayh, called
upon the state legislature to take "aggressive action to ensure that Indiana did not
become the dumping-ground of... the East Coast." 03 Later, in his State of the
State address, Bayh reiterated his position stating, "we must end the financial
incentive that literally makes it pay for out-of-staters to dump in Indiana."'1 4 This
speech was accompanied by a legislative proposal which attempted to directly
restrict the influx of exogenous waste.1 5 This legislation, HEA 1240, placed three
major restrictions upon waste importation. First, the Act required the operatorof any
vehicle carrying waste to be deposited in Indiana to present the landfill operator with
a verified statement describing the "location in which the largest part of the solid
waste was generated" (hauler certification). °6 Secondly, the law prohibited in-state
dumping of foreign waste unless the drive presented a document from a health officer
of the shipping state certifying that the solid waste did not contain any hazardous or
" See supra note 49.
"Government Suppliers, 753 F. Supp. at 770. The state may pass along legitimate fees associated with its
processing of out-of-state wastes. Id.
Pomper, supra note 47, at 1332.
"Id. at 1333.
11 Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENvNT. L. 153,
154-58 (1988). Although regulatory commands have been employed for 20 years, to achieve environmental
goals, they are inherently incapable of efficiently securing these goals. Id.
101 IND. CODE ANN § 13-7-22-2.7 (c), (d), & (e) (Bums Supp. 1990); Ind. Code 13-9.5-5-1 (a)(2)(A) (Burns
1990).
" Government Suppliers, 753 F. Supp. at 743.
103 Id. at 745.
I4 Id. at 746.
105 Jd.
10" IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-22-2.7 (c) (1) (Bums Supp. 1990).
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infectious waste in violation of federal or Indiana law (health certificate)."°7 Finally,
the law imposed a tipping fee which varied with the point of origin of the waste.
Essentially, the fee was set so that the total cost of dumping foreign waste in Indiana
would equal the cost of dumping the trash at the landfill nearest the point of
generation (tipping fee).30 House Enrolled Act 1240 was signed into law March 20,
1990, by Governor Bayh. 19 The first two provisions of the law became effective
immediately, while the tipping fee was to become effective Jan. 1, 1991.110
Out-of-state- haulers immediately challenged HEA 1240 as a violation of the
Commerce Clause.II' In Government Suppliers Consolidating Servs., Inc. v. Bayh,
U.S. District Judge Tinder issued an extensive opinion which examined each
requirement of the Act in light of Commerce Clause restraints." 2 To determine the
facial or practical discriminatory effect upon interstate commerce, the court sub-
jected each requirement to a test of "elevated scrutiny"."' The court explained that
if the requirement survived "elevated scrutiny", it would then be analyzed under the
Pike v. Bruce Church"4 balancing test for its evenhandedness.I 5 Under the Pike
test, legitimate local interests which incidentally burden commerce will be tolerate
unless the burden is clearly excessive in relation to the local benefits."
6
Clearly, the tipping fee provision was the heart of the economic control
Indiana wished to exert on out-of-state shippers. Thus, the validity of this provision
was essential to the implementation of the Act. Judge Tinder found that the State
had facially articulated a legitimate local purpose" 7 and that the fee scheme would,
as a direct result, preserve valuable landfill space and reduce the overall need for
hazardous waste cleanup." 8 The court thus concluded that the tipping fee provision
did advance the State's general interest in the health and safety of its citizens." 9
However, the court found that reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives existed,
20
107 IND. CODE ANNu. § 13-7-22-2.7 (c) (2) (Burns Supp. 1990).
103 IND. CoDE ANNr. § 13-9.5-5-1 (a)(2) (Burns Supp. 1990). This section imposed a tipping fee of $.50/ton
for Indiana trash but required an out-of-state trash a fee equivalent to disposal costs at the point of
generation. bIN. CODE ANN. 313-9.5-5-1(a)(l)&(2) (Burns. Supp. 1990).
'"9 Government Suppliers, 753 F. S upp. at 743. House Enrolled Act 1240 was codified upon passage. See
supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
110 Government Suppliers, 753 F. Supp. at 766.
11 'GovernmentSuppliers, 734F. Supp. 853 (S.D. Ind. 1990). Plaintiffs soughtimmediate relief in the form
of a temporary restraining order which the court converted into a motion for preliminary injunction. ld. at
857. However, only the health certificate requirement was enjoined. Id. at 871-72.
12 Government Suppliers, 753 F. Supp. at 762.
"' Id. at 763. This would require the state to justify the burden placed upon commerce by showing that the
statute has a legitimate local purpose, serves this interest and there does not exist an adequate non-
discriminatory alternative. Id.
14 Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
'15 Government Suppliers, 753 F. Supp. at 763.
116 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
',Government Suppliers, 753 F. Supp. at 770.
l'Id. at 769.
"9Id. at 770.
12I d. For example, all waste disposal could be slowed by the imposition of a flat fee on all shipments. 11
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and held the fee provision discriminatory in practical effect.' As a result, the
tipping fee was struck down as violative of the Commerce Clause.'
22
In similar fashion, the provision requiring the health officer certification was
struck for the same reasons. 23  The provision requiring the hauler certificate
survived "elevated scrutiny"," but it succumbed to the Pike balancing test. 25 The
court found that, even though evenhanded in its application, the provision imposed
burdens clearly in excess of their putative local benefits. 26
The court noted in conclusion that while the three regulations could not
survive as formulated, the holding was not to be interpreted as foreclosing future
regulatory efforts to control the influx of out-of-state waste.127
While the Bayh holding speaks directly to the three specific provisions of
House Enrollment Act 1240, the tone is clear and strong. In order to be effective,
economic restraints must be severe enough to remove the incentive to import waste.
However, the evenhanded application of such restraints requires the same burdens
be placed upon the disposal of local wastes. While such an approach would pass
Commerce Clause scrutiny, 2 the political reality of imposing such requirements
makes them impractical. It appears the federal courts are not prepared to enlarge the
traditional Commerce Clause doctrine to sanction purely economic regulation of
interstate waste transport.
B. Market Participant Exception
The most obvious yet unappealing alternative is to put the state in the position
of landfill operator and apply the market participant exception.12 9 In LeFrancois v.
State of Rhode Island, 30 the district court upheld the prohibition of out-of-state
dumping at the state operated, sole disposal facility in Rhode Island. '3 The court
held that when a state directly operates a landfill, it enters the market as a provider
12 Id. at 772.
122Id.
" Id. at 773-74. An obvious non-discriminatory alternative was to force all haulers to present a health
certificate. Id. at 774. Such an evenhanded approach would effectively slow the dumping of all waste and
promote alternative disposal methods. Id.
'2 Id. at 776.
121 Id. at 778-79.
126 Id. at 779.
12 1 Id. at 780. Following the ruling, Bayh stated, "We will not let down in the fight against the indiscriminate
dumping of trash in Indiana." Bayh said he planned to meet with state legislators and governors to solicit
help in getting federal law changed. The Youngstown Vindicator, Dec. 21, 1990, BI at col. 1.
'- City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626-27. The slowing of all waste would be permissible if done
evenhandedly. Id.
129 Pomper, supra note 47, at 1311 (citing 53 Fed. Reg. 33,318 (1988)). Municipal solid waste landfills are
predominantly owned by local governments (80%) and an additional 1% are owned by state governments.
Id.
LeFrancois v. State of Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204 (A.R.I. 1987).
I d. at 1206-07.
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of services 32 and not as a participant in the natural resource market. 33 As such, the
state escapes the usual Commerce Clause restraints."
However, even if a state were prepared to enter the landfill business, it could
not prevent private entrepreneurs from entering the market as well. Therefore, any
economic sanctions which might be effective under the market participant exception
would be lost on the private operator. 35 Again, direct economic regulation on a state
wide basis fails to produce the desired effect.
C. A Modified Participant Exception: The County-Wide Approach
While the courts have demonstrated reluctance to find state-wide regulatory
action within the scope of legitimate control, a trend seems to be emerging which
affords some deference to county and regional waste management districts.'36 In
1965, Congress enacted the Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA) 137 which, in part,
provides for the development and implementation of state or regional solid waste
plans. "'38 Under such plans, each state is required to identify areas within its
boundaries which are appropriate for carrying out regional solid waste management
Typically, these management regions are established on a county-wide basis, 39 but
in the case of rural areas, a multi-county region may be created."4 Each state plan
must contain requirements that all solid waste, including waste originating in other
states, be disposed of in an environmentally sound manner. 14' While each state has
discretion within SWDA to develop individual plans, 42 the individual management
regions have emerged as quasi-market regulators which may effectively prohibit the
importation of much foreign waste. 43
In Kettlewell v. Michigan Dep' tofNaturalResources,'l the ownerofa private
132 Id. at 1211.
13I3d.
O Id. at 1212. Plaintiffs urged the court to develop a "monopoly exception" which would impose a duty
on the state to deal with out-of-state haulers. Id. Quoting Shayne Bros. Inc., v. District of Columbia, 592
F. Supp. 1128, 1134 (D.D.C. 1984), the court found the state expenditures that provide landfill services
were indistinguishable from those used for police, firefighters and teachers, and that those activities do not
offend the Commerce Clause. Id.
35 Pomper, supra note 47 at 1338-39. Pomper argues that excessive social costs could justify withholding
private landfill space as well. Id.
'
36 See Kettlewell Excavating, 732 F. Supp. at 764. County waste disposal plans which apply equally to
other Michigan counties as well as to other states do not discriminate against interstate commerce. d. C.f.,
Diamond Waste, Inc. v. Monroe County, 731 F. Supp. 505 (M.D. Ga. 1990).
13' Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901-6992 (1988).
13s Id. at § 6941.
139 Id. at § 6942.
140 id. at §6949.
141 Id. at § 6943 (a)(2).
142 Id. at § 6941a(6). Congress found that conservation and recovery programs should he available to
communities in proportion to their individual needs and potential. Id.
'W See Evergreen Waste Sys. v. Metropolitan Service Dist., 820 F.2d. 1482 (9th Cir. 1987). (Held that
evenhandedness requires simply that out-of-state waste be treated no differently from most in-state waste.)
4" Kettlewell Excavating, 732 F. Supp. at 761. 13
Harper: Solid Waste Transport
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1991
AKRON LAW REviEw
landfill challenged a Michigan law145 which required explicit approval of a county
waste management district before any waste generated outside the county could be
deposited there. 146 In applying a traditional Commerce Clause analysis, the court
concluded the plan was not facially discriminatory because the requirement applied
equally to Michigan counties outside the management region as well as to out-of-
state entities. 147 The court went on to apply the Pike balancing test, 14 and found the
policy to serve a legitimate local purpose by extending the useful life of the county's
landfills while imposing minimal burdens on interstate commerce. 49
Similarly, in Swin v. Lycoming County, 50 the county operated alandfill forthe
management district comprised of Lycoming and parts of five surrounding coun-
ties.' 5 ' The management district accepted out-of-state waste, but chose to limit the
volume and charge substantially higher fees than those charged to sources within the
district. 52 The court found the county, through its waste management district, to be
a market participant and thus exempt from Commerce Clause scrutiny.
53
Ohio emphasizes conserving sufficient solid waste disposal capacity. State
law requires that each county or joint solid waste management districtprepare a plan
that provides for and certifies the availability of sufficient capacity to meet the needs
of the district for a ten year period.1M Each plan must include an inventory of all
existing facilities as well as projections of volumes of disposable waste generated
within the district and to be imported from outside sources.'55 Pursuant to this plan,
a county may prohibit or limit the receipt of solid wastes generated outside the
district consistent with its projections of availability. 156 While this scheme does not
directly insert the county into market participation, it does vest the county with the
ability to control the importation of foreign waste. Since the statutory plan does not
overtly prohibit all importation of wastes and treats all extra-district waste identi-
cally, it should escape judicial condemnation as facially or practically discrimina-
tory.157 Like Kettlewell, Ohio's plan should also survive Pike as a legitimate exercise
of the state's police power, 5 and not be found to violate the Commerce Clause.
11 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 299.413a (West Supp. 1991) and 299.430(2) (West 1984 & Supp. 1991).
These statutes prevented the disposal of waste not generated within the county unless explicitly authorized
in the approved waste plan. Id.
" Kettlewell Excavating 732 F. Supp. at 762.
147 Id. at 764.
'" Id. at 766.
149 Id.
I" Swin Resource Sys., 883 F.2d at 245.
151 Id. at 247.
2 Id. at 247-48. Effective Sept. 1987, Lycoming charged a tipping fee of $30/ton for waste generated
outside the management district, and $10-$13.25/ton for waste generated inside the district. Id. at 248.
1"3 Id. at 254-55.
s Oio REV. CoDE ANN. § 3734.53(A) (Anderson 1988).
1'5 Id. at § 3734.53(A)(6).
I' Id. at § 3734.53(C)(1).
See Evergreen Waste Sys. v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 820 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1987).
'"See Kettlewell Excavating, 732 F. Supp. at 764.
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These cases and statutes underscore an emerging judicial attitude concerning
the relationship between legitimate local concern over waste importation and the
restraints of the Commerce Clause. Absent Congressional intervention, only a more
tolerant approach by the courts can provide relief from the increasingly difficult
balance of interests involved in this dilemma.
NON-REGULATORY EcoNoMIc INcENTrIvEs
For many years this country has sought to control the problem of environ-
mental degradation by relying upon the "Great Regulatory Tradition."'5 9 This so
called command and control approach relies extensively on regulatory decisions and
legal rules' 60 to effectuate desired environmental outcomes. A growing number of
commentators, however, view this method as creating an irresolvable conflict
between environmental goals and economic growth.' 6'
For example, Professor Richard Stewart, 162 in an address on environmental
policy, 163 characterized bureaucratic centralization and litigation as factors which
seriously aggravate the inevitable dysfunction of command and control regulation
and a misallocation of burdens which needlessly increase the costs of pollution
control.'" Alternatively, Stewart advocates an economic model based upon trans-
ferable pollution permits and waste deposit refund programs, 165 similar to those
already in place under provisions of the Clean Air Act. 66 Under this scheme, freely
marketable pollution permits would be issued in an amount equal to the number of
units of pollution permitted, and each polluter would be required to relinquish such
permits equal to his discharge. 61 This method, Stewart argues, creates market based
incentives to engage in recycling and proper disposal of waste.168 The incentive level
can be adjusted to achieve the level of environmental protection desired.169
Given the nature of solid waste disposal, it does not appear economically or
politically feasible to entirely abandon regulatory control. Under a free market
system, local municipalities would have to purchase disposal rights on an equal
footing with foreign generators. Even Stewart recognizes equity may require that
certain polluters, such as municipalities or economically marginal firms, be subsi-
159 F. ANDERSON, supra note 37, at 65. The phrase is attributed to Professor James Krier. Id.
160 Stewart, supra note 100, at 153.
161 Id. at 154-58.
62 Byrne Professor of Administrative Law, Harvard Law School.
6 Presented at a colloquium on New Directions in Environmental Policy, Columbia University, Oct. 1,
1987.
'" Stewart, supra note 100, at 156.
"1 Id. at 158.
'" Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7642 (1989). See F. ANDERSON, supra note 37, at 270-271.
167 Stewart, supra note 100, at 159.
168 Id.
169Id.
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dized by issuing them permits at reduced fees. 170
A PosSIBLE SOLLtION
Effective and efficient solutions can be found when the incentives of the
market place are allowed to operate within environmentally sound parameters.
While any regional solution must reflect the political willingness of an area to accept
foreign waste, a sense of realistic cooperation is required for implementation.
A hybrid version of the current regulatory schemes and free market incentives
could be a viable alternative. Under a regulatory scheme such as Ohio's, a given
waste management district could assess its projected local needs and the desired
level of excess disposal capacity it would be willing to market to the outside. Such
excess capacity could be "sold" in the form of freely negotiable permits. The cost
of such permits would reflect the political desire of that district to import waste.
Since these permits would be freely marketable, all foreign waste would be treated
similarly and should escape Commerce Clause restraints. The net effect is to limit
importation of foreign waste into those districts which environmentally or politi-
cally determine such reduction is necessary, while providing the economic incentive
to assure adequate capacity nationwide.
Additionally, all parties must recognize the diverse yet valid interests at stake
and make some accommodation towards resolution. A recent example of such
cooperation was demonstrated by the resolution of a long standing dispute between
the operators of the Browning-Ferris Industries' (BFI) Carbon Limestone Landfill
in Mahoning County, Ohio and nearby residents. 7 ' Concerned about the quality of
local water supplies, residents opposed the expansion of the landfill. 17 2 After three
years of highly charged rhetoric 73 andlegal battles,'74 BFI agreed to provide pipeline
water service to local residents in exchange for their agreement to permit expan-
sion.17 5 The final agreement will assure disposal capacity for county residents for
the next 30 years. 76 To achieve this goal, BFI agreed to voluntarily reduce its intake
of foreign waste generated beyond 150 miles.17 This blend of market incentives and
°
70 Id. at 164.
' The Youngstown Vindicator, March 29, 1991, Al, at c.l. 4.
' Id. at A3, col 2. Residents fought to shut the landfill because they said it contaminated ground water and
created traffic problems. Id.
'1"d. at Al, col. 4. The citizen's group Don't Use My Property (DUMP) had sought to have the landfill's
operating permit revoked. Id.
174 1d.
""The agreement contains a commitment from BFI to spend $1.5 million to extend water service to residents
whose well water may have been affected. Id. at A3, col. 2.
"
6 1d. atAl,col 5. Once the license application is approved by the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency,
BFI will be permitted to expand the landfill's area from 150 acres currently in use to more than 700 acres.
Id. at A3, col. 3. This additional capacity should serve local disposal needs for approximately 30 years. Id.
at A3, col. 2-3.
'1 Id. at A3, col. 2-3.
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voluntary restraint illustrates that solutions do exist, but require the innovative
cooperation of everyone involved.
CONCLUSION
Clearly, the Commerce Clause places substantial restraints on state efforts to
curb the influx of foreign waste. The market participant exception provides local and
state governments with limited ability to avoid scrutiny. However, in densely
populated areas and in those without adequate landfill capacity, it is unlikely that
control of the waste market will be exclusively within the public sector. While state
legislatures continue to develop regulatory schemes to prohibit interstate dumping
or reduce the attendant economic incentives, these measures are inevitably protec-
tionist and run afoul of the Commerce Clause. Governmental efforts to encourage
recycling may provide some limited relief, but the burden of efficient waste
management must fall to the forces of the free market system. Providing economic
incentives through freely negotiable pollution permits in coordination with county
or regional management would assure the existence of adequate disposal capacity
while reducing the incentive to ship large volumes of waste to interstate disposal
sites.
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